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A New Approach to
‘Perfect’ Hallucinations
Abstract: I consider a new, non-disjunctive strategy for ‘relational’or
‘naïve realist’ theories to respond to arguments from ‘perfect’ (caus-
ally matching) hallucinations. The strategy, in a nutshell, is to treat
such hypothetical cases as instances of perception rather than hallu-
cination. After clarifying the form and dialectic of such arguments, I
consider three objections to the strategy. I provide answers to the first
two objections but concede that the third — based on the possibility of
‘chaotic’ (uncaused) perfect hallucinations — cannot obviously be
dealt with by the proposed strategy. However, such ‘chaotic’ scenar-
ios are also problematic for standard representational accounts of
experience. Thus I conclude that perfect hallucinations pose no more
of a threat to the relational theory than to its main representational
rival.
Though it surely remains the standard view, both amongst neuro-
scientists and amongst philosophers, that conscious experience super-
venes only on the brain (or some parts/processes within the brain), in
recent years there has been a very marked surge of interest in ‘naïve
realist’ or ‘relational’ theories of perceptual experience.1 Such theo-
ries deny that all conscious experiences supervene solely on factors
internal to the subject’s body — perceptual experiences, the so-called
‘good case’, are alleged to essentially or constitutively involve ele-
ments in the external environment as well as elements internal to the
subject. This recent interest has been due, in large part, to the develop-
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ment of new, disjunctivist strategies for responding to arguments from
hallucination.2 It is widely agreed that the strongest versions of such
arguments that a disjunctivist faces are based on the possibility of
‘perfect’ or ‘causally matching’ hallucinations.3 It is in response to
this sort of possibility that M.G.F. Martin has developed his ‘negative
epistemic’ account of hallucinations.4 Martin’s work, I think it is fair
to say, represents the current state-of-the-art in disjunctivist strategies
for defending a naïve realist/relational account of experience.5
This paper is not about disjunctivism. Instead, I want to consider a
different, non-disjunctive line that one sympathetic to the relational
model of perceptual experience might take in response to arguments
based on ‘perfect’ hallucinations. In brief: the usual thought-experi-
mental cases of ‘perfect hallucinations’ should be treated as relational
experiences of something external. I suspect that this line of response
may initially seem somewhat radical; that is to say, implausible. But I
hope that by the paper’s end I will have made the case that this sort of
response has a much firmer dialectical footing than might first appear.
Indeed, I will argue that by adopting this line of response, the rela-
tional theory ends up in the same position with respect to perfect hal-
lucinations as its main rival, the representational theory. But to begin I
will briefly discuss the general form and dialectic of arguments from
hallucination. I’ll also clarify what I take the basic structure of the
relational model of experience to be and how it differs from other pos-
sible accounts.
1. Arguments from Hallucination and from Perception
Boiling arguments from hallucination down to their simplest form,
there are two premises and a conclusion:
(1) Natural H-premise: Hallucinations are conscious epi-
sodes that are not essentially relational.
(2) Common kind assumption (CK): Hallucinations and
perceptual experiences are the same essential kind of con-
scious episodes.
(3) Revisionary P-conclusion: Therefore, perceptual experi-
ences are conscious episodes that are not essentially
relational.
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When discussing arguments from hallucination, most philosophical
effort is typically expended in considering premise (2), the CK
assumption. The two standard reasons adduced in support of CK are:
(i) Hallucinatory and perceptual experiences might be ‘sub-
jectively indistinguishable’ to the subject.
(ii) Hallucinatory and perceptual experiences might involve
exactly the same neural activity.
In each case we need a further linking conditional claim in order to
support CK:
(iii) If two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable then
they are of the same essential kind.
(iv) If two experiences involve exactly the same neural activ-
ity then they are of the same essential kind.
The disjunctivist strategy, of course, is to deny CK and so if, as has
seemed plausible, we must allow the possibilities described in (i)
and/or (ii) then a disjunctivist will need to deny the conditional claims
made in (iii) and/or (iv). Of course, much more should be and has been
said about all this, but I will say no more about the possibility or plau-
sibility of denying CK.
In contrast to the attention lavished on CK (and on claims like (iii)
and (iv)), premise (1) — the ‘Natural H-premise’ — in our basic argu-
ment from hallucination is rarely argued for or scrutinized. Perhaps it
is taken as simply the meaning of ‘hallucination’ that it is a conscious
episode in which the external world does not play any essential role.
However, it is worth noticing that even accepting the CK assump-
tion, a theorist who wished to hang on to a direct-relational model of
perceptual experience could construct the following ‘argument from
perception’:
(1*) Natural P-premise: Perceptual experiences are conscious
episodes that are essentially relational.
(2*) CK assumption: Hallucinations and perceptual experi-
ences are the same essential kind of conscious episodes.
(3*) Revisionary H-conclusion: Therefore, hallucinations are
conscious episodes that are essentially relational.
The two arguments are entirely symmetrical — the conclusion of each
is the denial of the other’s first premise. Both go from an intuitively
‘natural’ staring point, via the CK premise, to a ‘revisionary’ conclu-
sion. Given the symmetry it would seem that the only room left for
argumentative manoeuvre would be to give reasons independent of
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either such arguments that one or other natural premise is preferable,
or equivalently that one or other revisionary conclusion is the less
acceptable. (Notice: I am not suggesting that the best reasons for
wanting to endorse either ‘Natural’ claim will be their (alleged) natu-
ralness or intuitive plausibility: e.g. there are many possible reasons to
want to endorse the Natural P-premise other than its (allegedly) fitting
with the views of the naïve. For what it’s worth, I think that it’s far
from clear that the non-philosophical populace do straightforwardly
endorse either Natural claim, and even if they did it’s not at all clear
that this should bear much dialectical weight.)
CK, in itself, does not point us towards either the Revisionary
P-conclusion or the Revisionary H-conclusion. Moreover, for the con-
clusion of the argument from hallucination to be decisive — i.e. pre-
ferred to the conclusion of the symmetrical argument from perception
— it is not enough just to argue that the Natural H-premise (1) is plau-
sible and counter-intuitive to deny, it has to be shown on grounds
other than the argument from hallucination that the Natural H-prem-
ise (1) is more plausible and counter-intuitive to deny than the Natural
P-premise (1*) (i.e. denying the Natural H-premise is worse than
denying the Natural P-premise). It was supposed to be the conclusion
of the argument from hallucination that we should deny, against our
naïve intuitions, the Natural P-premise, yet now we need reasons to
deny the Natural P-premise, rather than denying the Natural H-prem-
ise, before the argument from hallucination gets started. CK then can
only get us to one revisionary conclusion rather than the other if we
already have prior, independent reasons to prefer one revisionary con-
clusion to the other.
At this point you might, quite reasonably, want to protest: OK, we
can all accept the elementary logical point that CK could be used in an
‘argument from perception’ as well as an argument from hallucina-
tion. One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. Never-
theless, whatever motivations in favour of (1*) there are supposed to
be, to endorse (3*)/deny (1) is just absurd! Of course there are con-
scious experiences, which we normally call ‘hallucinations’, in which
we do not have any essentially relational conscious awareness of
mind-independent features (likewise with dream experiences). So the
‘argument from perception’ is a non-starter; the argument from hallu-
cination is the only one we need consider.
I agree that it would be far-fetched to claim that all conscious expe-
riences, both perceptions and hallucinations (and dreams), are essen-
tially relational, constitutively involving mind-independent features.
And yet something like this position has been endorsed by some
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theorists. Both Alston (1999) and Langsam (1997) have endorsed (or
at least toyed with) the view that in visual hallucinations we have
(direct) conscious awareness of regions of physical space, i.e. the kind
of conscious episode is still essentially a relation involving the mind-
independent environment. Then there is Johnston (2004), who pro-
poses that in hallucination we have relational conscious awareness of
uninstantiated universals, or Butchvarov (1994) who claims that we
have conscious awareness of Meinong-style non-existents.
Though we should at least allow for the possibility that it is our intu-
itive conception of hallucinations, rather than of perceptions, that we
end up having to revise, I don’t want to endorse any of these
revisionary views concerning hallucinations in general. Everyone
should accept that there are in fact a variety of real-life conscious epi-
sodes in which we have rich visual experiences that are not instances
of relational awareness of mind-independent features — e.g. vivid
dreams, sensory deprivation, drug-induced reveries, etc. But such epi-
sodes are not the sort of possibility described in (ii); they do not pre-
cisely replicate the neural activity or stimulation of a perceptual
experience. So they cannot be used, via (iv), to support the CK
assumption. And so they put little pressure on the relational theorist.
Nor is it obvious that such real-life hallucinatory episodes normally
satisfy condition (i) either. Whilst undergoing dreams or drug-
induced hallucinations one might take the experience to be of real
environmental items; one may not be able to distinguish the situation
from one of perception. However, dreams and hallucinations often
affect judgment as well as sensory faculties. And on later calm reflec-
tion, subjects generally don’t want to say that such episodes are phe-
nomenally identical to everyday perceptual experience. After all, we
have adjectives such as ‘dream-like’ or ‘hallucinatory’, which are
often used precisely to describe the distinctive phenomenology of
such episodes, i.e. that an hallucinatory experience may not, at the
time, be distinguishable from some normal perceptual situation does
not show that a normal perceptual experience is, at the time it occurs,
indistinguishable from the hallucinatory situation. So these familiar,
real-life sorts of episodes, of dreaming and hallucinating, cannot be
used to support CK and so they are just not relevant to the argument
from hallucination.
In so far as perfect hallucinations pose the real threat, a relational
theorist might hold that for the restricted class of ‘perfect hallucina-
tions’ only, we can endorse a more limited version of the argument
from perception:
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(1#) Natural P-premise: Perceptual experiences are conscious
episodes that are essentially relational.
(2#) Restricted CK assumption: Perfect hallucinations and
perceptual experiences are the same essential kind of con-
scious episodes.
(3#) Revisionary Perfect H-conclusion: Therefore, so-called
perfect hallucinations are conscious episodes that are
essentially relational. (And so such episodes should not
really be called ‘hallucinations’ after all.)
If this is a viable strategy, then the relational theorist might simply
accept (i) and (ii) whilst holding onto her preferred model of percep-
tual experience. The class of experiences that is supposed to cause the
most problems for the relational model will have been accommodated
without recourse to the subtleties of disjunctivism. Now, to anticipate,
there remains an even more restricted, hypothetical class of perfect
hallucinations that cannot be treated in this way — what I’ll call Per-
fect Chaotic Hallucinations, in which there is just nothing external to
the brain for it to be related to. But, as I will argue in Section 6, these
highly fanciful possible cases are equally problematic for standard
versions of the representational view of experience. And so the dialec-
tical position we are left in is that perfect hallucinations pose no more
of a problem for the relational theory than they do for the main rival
representational position.
2. What Exactly is the
Relational Model of Experience?
It is worth briefly clarifying what might be meant by a ‘relational
model of experience’.
Here are two very schematic diagrams which, taken together, illus-
trate the standard, common factor model for both perceptual and hal-
lucinatory experience:
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On the common factor conception of perceptual experiences — which
combines phenomenal internalism about perception and hallucination
— the kind of conscious event that occurs in perceptual and hallucina-
tory cases can be the same essential kind of consciousness. The causal
antecedents in each case determine whether the subject counts as per-
ceiving or hallucinating but they have no bearing on the essential kind
of conscious awareness that occurs in each case, which supervenes
solely on factors internal to the subject’s brain (and nervous system).
Now consider these diagrams of two different conceptions of how
an external environmental object or feature might be essentially
involved in a conscious perceptual episode:
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Figure 1. Phenomenal internalist model of perception.
Figure 2. Phenomenal internalist model of hallucination.
According to the necessary casual preconditions conception (illus-
trated in Figure 3), the environmental object has some kind of essen-
tial involvement in determining the fundamental kind of conscious
state that occurs — a key role that is familiar from externalist accounts
of mental content. But this kind of object-dependence is quite differ-
ent to the sort of object-dependence conceived by the constitutive
model of experience (illustrated in Figure 4). According to this latter
view, the environmental object is literally a part of the experience
itself, not just an essential precondition for the experience to occur.
These two different conceptions of the perceptual case suggest two
parallel possible conceptions of hallucinatory experience:
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Figure 3. Non-proximate necessary causal preconditions (perceptual).
Figure 4. Constitutive environmental element (perceptual).
Whilst the orthodox common factor view is a combination of a phe-
nomenal internalist view of perception with the phenomenal intern-
alist view of hallucination (Figures 1 and 2), the various models above
suggest a range of other possible combinations. If I understand him
right, the combination that Martin (2006) argues for is to treat percep-
tual experiences as having necessary causal preconditions (Figure 3)
whilst accepting the phenomenal internalist model for hallucinations
(Figure 2) — that is, continuing to treat the hallucinatory case the
same way as a common factor theorist. This approach then has to con-
cede that when N occurs in the perceptual case it is both a conscious
event of the distinctively perceptual kind and a conscious event of the
kind that occurs in hallucinations also. To concede that there is a
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Figure 5. Non-proximate necessary causal preconditions (hallucinatory).
Figure 6. Constitutive environmental element (hallucinatory).
common kind of conscious event that occurs in both the perceptual
and hallucinatory cases might seem pretty damaging to the relational
view, as this common factor threatens to ‘screen off’ the distinctively
perceptual kind of event from doing explanatory work. But Martin
claims to avoid the ‘screening off’ threat with his negative epistemic
account of hallucinations, on which there is nothing more to being an
hallucination than to be indistinguishable by reflection from the corre-
sponding perception. Given this ‘parasitic’ account of hallucination,
the distinctively perceptual event is, so Martin argues, no longer
‘screened off’ from being explanatory.
A combination that Snowdon (2005) argues is ‘dubiously coherent’
would be to treat perceptual experience according to the constitutively
environmental model (Figure 4) whilst treating hallucination accord-
ing to the phenomenal internalist model (Figure 2). Such a combina-
tion of models would entail that there are two experiences in the
perceptual case, one that is constituted by N alone and one in which N
is just a component.
…[I]t seems to me that this view is dubiously coherent. It is hard to
understand the possibility of, say, simultaneously undergoing an expe-
rience that is a hallucination as of a pink elephant against a black back-
ground, and also another perceptual experience of a pink elephant
against a black background. As total experiences they seem to compete.
(Snowdon, 2005, p. 303)
Instead, Snowdon tentatively suggests a disjunctivist might think of
perception as requiring a constitutive environmental element (Figure
4) whilst thinking of hallucinations according to the necessary casual
preconditions model (Figure 5). Those already committed to a com-
mon factor theory might find it implausible that an hallucination, a
paradigmatically ‘inner’ conscious event, should have externalist nec-
essary conditions for that kind of conscious event to occur. But any-
one sympathetic to a relational model, or to externalism about the
mind more generally, might well feel that this is a pretty minor revi-
sion, a small price to pay, if it allows one to hold onto the relational
model of perception.
This leaves further possible options. Most obviously a theorist
might think of both the perceptual and the hallucinatory case accord-
ing to the necessary causal precondition models (Figures 3 and 5).
This would seem a natural position for a theorist to take in so far as it
posits one set of non-proximal necessary conditions that make N a
conscious event of one kind and other non-proximal necessary condi-
tions that make N a conscious event of another kind. This would seem
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to avoid the issue that faced Martin’s combination — externalist pre-
conditions for perception with phenomenal internalism for hallucina-
tion — where the perceptual episode involves a conscious event that is
essentially of both kinds. So long as in principle all the possible non-
proximal conditions divide into those that make N an instance of per-
ceptual awareness and those that make N an instance of hallucinatory
awareness, then N will never be a conscious event of both kinds. Now
there are, of course, notorious difficulties in providing neat, non-cir-
cular criteria for deciding whether a causal path from object to subject
is of the right kind for the subject to count as perceiving (as opposed
to, say, veridically hallucinating). But just these same difficulties will
eventually have to be faced by common factor theorists as well.
Everyone wants to be able to mark some kind of distinction between
perceptions and hallucinations even if one thinks that the essential
kind of conscious state/event that occurs is the same in both cases, and
so one still faces the question of how to distinguish the ‘right kind’ of
causal chains from ‘deviant’ chains even if one is a phenomenal
internalist about both perception and hallucination.
Regarding the causal preconditions model of perception (Figure 3),
one might well wonder whether it really captures the core ‘naïve real-
ist’ notion of perceptual experience being ‘openness to the world’.
The non-proximate necessary conditions on N counting as an event of
perceptual consciousness are analogous to externalist conditions on
the content of a mental state. But the idea of perceptual experience
being a genuine relation, or encounter, involving both subject and
object, is, you might think, quite different from the notion that percep-
tual experience possesses object-dependent individuation conditions.
The worry then is that appealing to external causal preconditions is
more suitable to an intentionalist theory of experience, on which the
content of perceptual experience is distinctively object-dependent.
Could we really have genuinely relational awareness when N by itself
is admitted to constitute the conscious experience and the object
merely provides a necessary precondition for that kind of conscious
event to occur? This is not, of course, any kind of argument that
appealing to necessary external conditions on certain kinds of experi-
ence cannot capture the idea of ‘direct’or ‘unmediated’awareness of a
mind-independent feature; I am merely voicing a worry or suspicion.
In any case, for the remainder of this paper I will simply assume that
a relational or ‘naïve realist’ theory of perceptual experience is best
captured by the constitutive environmental element model (Figure 4).
The possibility I now want to explore is whether one might also
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coherently think of a perfect hallucination along the same constitu-
tively environmental lines (Figure 6).
3. (Most) So-Called ‘Perfect
Hallucinations’ are Perceptions
The usual way in which the thought-experimental scenario of a ‘per-
fect hallucination’ is set up goes something like this:6 take some nor-
mal perceptual experience — in which one sees, say, a lemon — and
somehow monitor exactly the pattern of stimulation that occurs in the
subject’s optic nerves resulting from the cells ‘upstream’ firing in the
subject’s retina. Now detach the subject’s retina from the optic nerve,
but recreate exactly the pattern of stimulation that the optic nerves
received by attaching them to some sort of hypothetical machine.
Alternatively, one might prefer not to use the same subject at two dif-
ferent times — for the overall neural states of the brain are bound to be
slightly different given the passage of time, the new memories
formed, etc. So perhaps instead we should imagine a type-identical
Twin subject, or type-identical brain-in-a-vat being administered the
type-identical pattern of stimulation. Or yet again, we could frame
things in terms of the same individual, in exactly the same neural state,
getting the same pattern of stimulation in two different possible
worlds, in one due to a lemon, in the other due to some neuroscientific
trickery. However, with Twin subjects, or with the same subject in two
different possible worlds, it becomes harder to make sense of the two
experiences being ‘subjectively indiscriminable’ — there is no oppor-
tunity for a single subject to discriminate between the two. So perhaps
then it is simplest to appeal to an evil demon, whose precise means of
recreating exactly the same neural state and exactly the same pattern
of stimulation as in the normal scenario need not be further specified.
The machine/demon/neuroscientist is supposed to provide a stimu-
lus input to the brain, but it is not supposed to meddle with the internal
processing of the brain. And for good reason — if the demon/device is
intervening in the neural processing then we do not have neural simi-
larity with the good case and so we lose one main motivation to treat
the two cases as being the same essential kind of conscious experi-
ence. (As we’ll see below, to plausibly match a temporally extended
perceptual experience, the device would also have to monitor and
respond to outgoing afferent impulses to saccade, change head posi-
tion, focus attention, etc.)
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In any case, proponents of these scenarios want us to conceive of it
as one in which the machine has caused one to have an ‘inner’, non-
object-involving visual experience — an experience where things
look just as if there were a lemon before one. A blow to the back of the
head might cause one to visually experience ‘spots before one’s eyes’,
but such an experience is not a visual experience of the punch (nor of
the back of one’s own head). Likewise, we are supposed to imagine
that the machine caused the lemon-looking experience, but that the
experience is not of the machine — we do not have (direct) visual
awareness of the machine. I suggest that a relational theorist should
resist this conception and contend instead that in such scenarios we
would indeed be having a visual experience of some aspect or feature
of the mind-independent machine. I will not be trying to show that
such a relational account of a perfect hallucination is superior to the
normal common factor approach. I aim only to show that a relational
account of perfect hallucinations is a coherent and defensible view
that anyone already sympathetic to the relational account of percep-
tion should seriously consider.
There is an analogous line of thought, much discussed in the philo-
sophical literature on scepticism, which holds that a brain-in-a-vat
(BIV) would have largely true beliefs about its vat-world, and so
would presumably also count as perceiving its vat-environment.
Putnam (1981), Davidson (1986), and Chalmers (2005) are perhaps
the most prominent philosophers to have urged that a (long-term) BIV
would have true beliefs about its vat-environment — though the idea
goes back at least to Bouwsma (1949).7 Putnam argues for this on the
basis of a causal theory of reference, whilst Davidson appeals to his
preferred interpretational account of reference. Chalmers argues that
were a ‘Matrix’hypothesis true, this would not show that the world we
experience is unreal, just that there is a further computational level to
reality we had not suspected before and that the universe was bigger
than we had previously thought — which would allow most of a
Matrix-dweller’s everyday beliefs to still be true. Putnam, Davidson,
and Chalmers focus on the BIV’s beliefs, but on all of these accounts
we are also presumably meant to think of the BIV as perceiving its
vat-world in so far as its visual experiences are allowing the formation
of true beliefs about features of the virtual vat-world or Matrix. There
is some distinguished support, then, for the idea that a BIV could be
thought of as perceiving mind-independent features — not features of
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the environment that the vat is physically situated in, but rather mind-
independent features in a virtual, computer-generated environment.
Putting this in terms of representational content: the content of the
(life-long) BIV’s visual experience is about the vat-generated virtual
environment, not about the physical environment that the vat and
brain are both physically situated in. And so such experience should,
in general, count as veridical perception rather than hallucination.
The position I am considering, on behalf of the relational theorist,
agrees then with Putnam, Davidson, and Chalmers to the extent that a
BIV should count as perceiving a mind-independent feature (albeit an
unorthodox sort of feature in a very unorthodox sort of environment).
However, there are also very significant differences between the view
I am advancing and the Putnamian position on BIVs. Putnam,
Davidson, and Chalmers are all making an anti-sceptical point. They
are primarily concerned with the reference and truth of the subject’s
beliefs, not with the metaphysical nature of her experiences — i.e.
theirs is an epistemological thesis concerning BIVs. In contrast, I am
proposing a thesis about the metaphysics of experience; specifically
the metaphysics of a perfect hallucinatory experience.
A common factor theorist about the metaphysics of experience can
happily accept the Putnam/Davidson/Chalmers conclusion — that a
BIV’s beliefs would be largely true and would refer to elements in the
virtual vat-environment — whilst insisting that a neurally identical
normal subject and BIV will be in the same fundamental kind of con-
scious state. Likewise, it’s possible for a common factor theorist to
accept that a BIV’s experiences veridically represent the vat-environ-
ment, whilst a neurally identical normal subject’s brain veridically
represents the normal physical environment. They just need to hold
that experiences are fundmentally individuated on internal/phenome-
nal grounds and not according to their (wide) contents. After all, for a
common factor theorist the question of whether the BIV is perceiving
or hallucinating has no bearing on the essential kind of experience the
BIV enjoys, which is held to be fundamentally the same in either case.
Conversely, the position I am proposing — that in a perfect halluci-
nation the subject enjoys a relational, constitutively environmental
experience — does not commit us to the Putnamian view that a (long-
term) BIV, or a subject who has enjoyed perfect hallucinations
throughout her life, would have largely true beliefs. The thesis is
solely about the metaphysics of a perfect hallucinatory experience,
not about the truth or the reference of any beliefs that get formed
downstream from the experience.
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Another significant difference is that the Putnam/Davidson/
Chalmers thesis is only supposed to apply to long-term BIVs. If the
brain in the vat has only recently been envatted, having previously
been housed in a normal subject’s cranium, then its thoughts and
beliefs will still (to begin with at least) refer to items in the standard
physical environment rather than to items within the virtual vat-envi-
ronment. And likewise, presumably, given a standard sort of story
about mental content, for the BIVs perceptual experiences: if I am
suddenly transported into my vat after a previously unvatted life, then
perhaps my visual experience as of a lemon will be counted as an hal-
lucination of a real lemon. Whereas if I have been a life-long BIV (or a
species of BIV that is adapted to the vat environment) then perhaps my
visual experience will be counted as a perception of a vat-lemon, or a
lemon*. In contrast, according to the relational account of perfect hal-
lucinations that I am proposing, even an otherwise normal subject
who has just a brief, one-off ‘perfect hallucination’ would be in rela-
tional experiential contact with some feature external to their own
minds — viz. some element or structure within the hallucination pro-
ducing apparatus.
To be clear, then, the present proposal is not that subjects have
exactly the same type of conscious experience when seeing a normal
lemon and when having a vat-machine-involving experience indistin-
guishable from seeing a lemon. In one case the subject’s experience
essentially involves an actual lemon, in the other it essentially
involves some aspect/feature of the stimulating vat-machine. But in
both cases the experience has the structure of a genuine relation to a
mind-independent feature. So the hypothesized perfect ‘hallucina-
tion’ would effectively be a rather novel and unorthodox kind of per-
ceptual episode, no different in principle to seeing a plastic lemon, or
a hologram of a lemon, or a trompe l’oeil painting of a lemon, etc.
Note: some might baulk at using the term ‘seeing’ when there are no
eyes, nor photons, involved. Likewise some might want to resist call-
ing this ‘perception’. But these labels are unimportant — so long as it
can be maintained that an experience with a genuinely relational
structure occurs, where the mind-independent feature is a genuine
constituent, ‘shaping’ the subjective phenomenology.
In short: whatever external factor (evil neuroscientist, vat-machine,
demon, etc.) is causing the ‘perfect’ hallucination, the relational theo-
rist can simply insist that this item (or some part/aspect/feature of it) is
the object in a relational experience. Within the literature on the argu-
ment from hallucination and naïve realism, this position has not, so far
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as I know, been explored at all. For the rest of the paper I will try to
flesh it out in enough detail so as to make it seem at least a live option.
There are three obvious objections/issues this strategy faces:
(1) You admit that there are cases of experiences — normal, every-
day, imperfect hallucinations, dreams, seeing stars after being hit
on the head, etc. — that are not essentially relations to external
objects. In these cases, whatever external cause there may be for
the experience — e.g. the object that strikes your head, the mes-
caline consumed, etc. — is admitted NOT to be the object of
experience. So why should these cases of perfect hallucination
be treated any differently?
(2) What is more, you admit that in these perfect hallucinatory cases
the experience would seem just like the normal case of, say, see-
ing a lemon. So you admit then that the experience does not
remotely seem to be a perception of a complicated neuroscientific
machine (nor an evil demon, etc.). Why then should we think that
this experience, apparently as of a lemon, is in fact a ‘perception’
of a neuroscientific machine (or an evil demon, etc.), when what
is subjectively presented appears nothing like such a machine
(nor a demon)?
(3) Your strategy requires that there is some or other external cause
of the experience in the perfect hallucination case. But we can
imagine a possible situation in which there is exactly the same
pattern of neural activity, but due to no external causal factor
whatsoever. E.g. a lone brain floating through the void might rec-
reate exactly the same pattern of activation as in a perception
through sheer random chance — quantum fluctuations inside the
neurons, or some such. If your strategy is unable to deal with this
‘chaotic’ sort of perfect hallucination, why bother with it in
(non-chaotic) cases where there is an external cause?
I will respond to these objections in turn over the next three sections.
4. Perception vs. Sensation
A relational theorist should be committed to the idea that a perceptual
experience is not instantaneous — it always has some non-negligible
duration. It also requires the right kind of structured stimulus and the
right kind of ‘exploratory’ activity/impulses on the subject’s part.
When these conditions are not met, the subject does not achieve per-
ceptual contact with the external world, and instead enjoys mere
visual sensation. (On the relational theory seeing is not built out of
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visual sensations; rather, to see is to cease to have mere visual sensa-
tions and instead to have visual awareness of discriminated environ-
mental entities.)
An example familiar from ‘ecological psychology’: a uniform level
of light stimulation from all directions results in an experience of uni-
form whiteness or ‘Ganzfeld’. There is a visual sensation — described
as ‘white’ — in response to optical stimulation but there is no percep-
tual awareness of one’s surroundings. Likewise, exposure to a sudden
flash of light after adapting to darkness is experienced as no more than
a sensation — there is no discrimination of any environmental entity
or feature.
The point here — made familiar to philosophers from the work of
Noë, Thompson, O’Regan, Hurley8 — is that we do not gain percep-
tual awareness of the entire scene before us all at once, the moment we
open our eyes. Noë calls this mistaken idea the ‘snapshot conception’
of visual experience (Noë, 2004) — that at any instant we have visual
awareness of the entire scene before us that is ‘sharply focused, uni-
formly detailed and high-resolution’ as well as ‘uniformly colourful’.
A range of empirical results — most famously those on ‘change blind-
ness’ — show that this simply is not the case. Our visual awareness of
a rich stable environment occurs over time and requires a process of
exploring the scene with our eyes; through the saccades our eyes make
three times a second and through movements of head and body.
Indeed, if our eyes are prevented from saccading and the head from
moving (and the scene before the subject is unchanging), after a few
seconds the subject will lose visual awareness of the scene.9 Simon
Ings, commenting on (and perhaps slightly dramatizing) this result,
writes:
The eye exists to detect movement. Any image, perfectly stabilised on
the retina, vanishes. Our eyes cannot see stationary objects, and must
tremble constantly to bring them into view. (Ings, 2007, p. 45)
For our purposes the key lesson here is that gaining perceptual visual
awareness of environmental features is a process that takes some
non-negligible span of time to occur, it requires that the eyes actively
(though mostly involuntarily) explore and ‘probe’ the objects in ques-
tion and it requires some degree of stability and order in those objects
during this period of scanning exploration. When these conditions are
not met — if the stimulus reaching the eyes is too brief, if the eyes
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(2011).
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cannot move around, if the stimulus is varying too wildly over time or
is completely constant — then the subject will be afforded only visual
sensation, conscious awareness that is not a genuine relation with
environmental features as constituents. John Campbell provides a
nice analogy for how brain processing should be conceived of on the
relational view:
If you are caught by the idea that the existence of brain processing
means that a Representationalist view must be correct, it may be helpful
to consider another analogy. Suppose we have a medium which, like
glass, can be transparent. But suppose that, unlike glass, it is highly vol-
atile and needs constant adjustment and recalibration if it is to remain
transparent in different contexts. Suppose, in fact, that the adjustment
required is always sensitive to the finest details of the scene being
viewed… You might think of visual processing as a bit like that. It is not
that the brain is constructing a conscious inner representation whose
intrinsic character is independent of the environment. It is, rather, that
there is a kind of complex adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in
each context, in order that you can be visually related to the things
around you; so that you can see them in other words. (Campbell, 2002,
p. 119)
Continuing with Campbell’s metaphor, in order for the mechanisms of
our visual system to ‘turn transparent’ and so ‘reveal the world’ there
is a certain minimum time and amount of activity required — they
need, as it were, to warm up and become attuned to the world. Like-
wise, the environment providing the stimulus cannot be too ‘un-pat-
terned’ or wildly varying if the visual system is to have the
opportunity to actively explore it a bit. Given favourable circum-
stances of operation, these visual mechanisms afford the conscious
subject direct, relational awareness of mind-independent features,
they do not generate arrays of inner sensations. When these conditions
are lacking the subject experiences a mere sensation. Or so says the
relational theorist.
How does all this bear on the hypothetical perfect hallucinations
and on the first objection mentioned above?
Well, given the foregoing constraints on a perceptual experience,
the hypothetical hallucination machine is not to be imagined as simply
providing a momentary stimulus to some region of the visual cortex,
so as to produce, say, a momentary sensation of red. If we are to imag-
ine that the hypothetical machine exactly recreates the pattern of the
stimulus and neural activity that would occur when the subject has a
perceptual experience of a lemon, say, the machine must be producing
a rich pattern of the stimulus that lasts some non-negligible span of
time.
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Moreover, this pattern of the stimulus must take account of and be
responsive to the active saccading that the subject would be perform-
ing. It would not suffice for the machine to provide the kind of stimu-
lus pattern that might occur as a normal perceiving subject saccades
around a visual field containing a lemon. The machine must take
account of the subject’s outbound saccadic impulses and volitions —
otherwise the stimulus that the subject receives will not vary in accord
with how she takes herself to be varying her point of focus. If it did not
take into account these actual saccadic impulses then the subject (or
the subject’s visual system) might be expecting to shift focus to the
left but receive visual stimulus as-of a shift of focus to the right of a
lemon. In such circumstances it seems clear that condition (ii) is not
met: the visual system + brain as a whole is not functioning identically
to the perceptual case. Nor, presumably, would things seem the same
phenomenally, as the subject would be aware of a confusing succes-
sion of sensations that bear no relation to their attentional activity,
rather than a ‘smooth’ perceptual experience.
The imagined machine, then, cannot just provide an ‘inbound’stim-
ulus pattern to the two optic nerves, it must also be able somehow to
monitor the ‘outbound’ saccadic impulses carried along the various
cranial nerves to the six orbital muscles and to the ciliary muscles in
each eye, and to adjust the stimulus pattern accordingly. Given the
foregoing constraints, then, it becomes much more plausible that the
machine (or the demon) provides some kind of standing structure,
which the subject can explore via different possible saccadic
impulses. Given that the machine cannot just provide momentary sen-
sory input to a passive subject, but must also be responsive to the sub-
ject’s active impulses and responses over a non-negligible stretch of
time, different subjects hooked-up to the machine might visually
explore the lemon-looking scene in different ways. I might scan left to
right across the ‘lemon’, whilst you scan top to bottom. That different
subjects could all agree on the way that things looked, despite having
directed their attention/focus in different patterns, and so enjoyed dif-
fering experiences, lends much plausibility, I suggest, to the idea that
they all had genuine relational awareness of the one same mind-inde-
pendent feature — some kind of standing structure in the machine.
Moreover, in a perfect hallucination case, unlike in cases of real-life
hallucination, dreaming, or being hit on the head, etc., the visual sys-
tem is by hypothesis functioning perfectly normally, exactly as it
would in the corresponding perceptual situation (from an internal
point of view anyway). So we also have anatomical grounds for
grouping perfect hallucinations with perceptions rather than with such
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non-object-involving episodes as real-life hallucinations, dreams, and
injuries to the head, etc.
5. Perceptual Relativity
How could having a visual experience indistinguishable from seeing a
lemon possibly count as having (direct) visual awareness of some
complicated neuroscientific device? The machine (presumably) sim-
ply would not look anything like a lemon!
The answer here is to bear in mind the relativity of perceptual
appearances: whilst, of course, the hypothesized machine will not
look anything like a lemon under most (the vast majority of) condi-
tions of visual awareness, given one very specific manner of viewing,
some specific part/feature of the machine does indeed look just like a
lemon.
Any theory of perceptual experience must account for the fact that
the same particular item can look different ways when experienced in
different circumstances, i.e. it must account for perceptual relativity
due to different angles of viewing, different lighting conditions, dif-
ferent conditions of the visual system, etc. A standard move made by a
relational theorist here is to insist that perceptual experience is not just
a simple two-place relation between conscious subject and object. It is
a three-place relation between the subject, object, and the manner/cir-
cumstances in which the object is perceived.10 The way the object
appears is the joint upshot of the nature of the object and the nature of
the perceptual circumstances — the angle and distance of viewing,
lighting conditions, the condition of the subject’s eyes and visual sys-
tem, etc.
A penny looks a certain way when viewed from a certain angle (it
looks the same way that a particular elliptical shape viewed from
head-on looks). And the penny looks a different way when viewed
from a different angle. Likewise, then, the idea is that the machine
looks a specific way — the way a lemon looks viewed from some stan-
dard viewpoint — when viewed in a very specific manner — i.e. when
the perceiving subject is ‘hooked up’ to the machine in the intended
way. Presumably the exterior of the machine will not look like a lemon
when viewed from any angle or under any lighting conditions, etc. But
there will be some internal feature or aspect of the machine, a ‘stand-
ing structure’, that must have been designed by the hypothetical
brain-scientists precisely so as to appear just like a lemon when it is
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experienced from a very particular ‘viewpoint’ — i.e. in the very spe-
cific manner and circumstances of awareness that obtains when the
subject is hooked up to the machine in just the right way. But if this
feature or structure in the machine is viewed from any other ‘perspec-
tive’, it will look nothing like a lemon.
Obviously the viability of this response turns on the viability of
treating the subject’s being hooked up to the machine as being just one
more possible manner of gaining visual awareness of the machine —
another viewpoint or perspective onto the machine. To repeat: if talk
of the subject seeing the machine sticks in your throat, this relational
strategy does not depend on any particular view as to the semantics of
the word ‘see’. All the naïve realist needs to maintain is that the sub-
ject’s visual experience, whether or not you want to call it ‘seeing’,
would be a genuine relation to a feature/aspect of the machine, and so
would have the same fundamental metaphysical structure as other epi-
sodes of visual perceptual experience.
An analogy might help here: ‘random dot’ autostereograms are a
kind of novelty image that enjoyed a burst of popularity in the 1990s
in the ‘Magic Eye’ series of books.11 When viewed normally these
images appear to be just a fuzzy array of ‘randomly’ coloured dots.
But if one learns to defocus one’s eyes in just the right way (to focus as
if on a point behind the image) then one sees what looks like a
three-dimensional shape/scene. One can then focus on and visually
explore different parts of this apparently 3D image just as one would
when looking at an object normally — one can even view apparently
3D animation films. This manifest way that the pattern of dots can
look does not require a particular angle of viewing, it requires that the
visual system is ‘geared’ in the right way.
So the manner and circumstances of viewing, which contribute to
the manifest way that things look, are not exhausted by the angle and
distance of viewing and the lighting conditions; the way that the sub-
ject’s visual system is ‘set up’ to engage with the environment is also a
factor. The 3D way that a stereogram picture can look is an aspect of
that picture that is open, in principle, for anyone to see so long as they
can get their visual system ‘geared’ in the required way.12 There is
surely no pressing reason for a relational theorist to conceive of the
subject’s experience of the 3D look of the stereogram as ‘inner’or hal-
lucinatory. The subject is simply looking at the stereogram in a new
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[11] Random dot stereograms were first discovered by Bela Julesz in 1959 and made into sin-
gle images (autostereograms) in 1979 by Julesz’s student Christopher Tyler.
[12] In fact 5–10% of people are unable to achieve this for various reasons.
manner and so is aware of the stereogram looking a new way (a way
similar to the way that 3D objects can look). The stereogram is a
mind-independent part of the environment, and the particular 3D way
that it looks can be seen, in principle, by anyone who gets their visual
system ‘set up’ in the required manner. The subject does not, accord-
ing to the direct-relational theorist, begin to hallucinate when she
defocuses her eyes in the required way — it is still the physical picture
that is looking that way to her and which she is (directly) visually
aware of.
I suggest that relational theorists should think of the subject getting
hooked up in the right way to the perfect-hallucination-machine as
being akin to the defocusing of the eyes required to see the stereo-
gram’s hidden image; it is an instance of getting the visual system set
up in a specific way so as to provide awareness of a specific mind-
independent feature looking a specific way. The lemon-looking aspect
of the machine will only be seen when the subject’s visual system is
set up in the required manner — that is, say, having the device con-
nected to the optic nerves in the right way.
The analogy with the autostereogram might also help to allay a fur-
ther worry one might have: which ‘interior’ part or region of the
machine exactly is the subject supposed to be visually aware of (when
things are looking to them just the way that a lemon usually looks)?
Well, consider the stereogram again: a certain pattern has been inge-
niously incorporated into the design of the random dots. It requires
looking at the dots in a particular way to see this pattern looking the
intended 3D way. My suggestion is that there must be something like
this pattern, a precisely constructed structure (e.g. a computer pro-
gram determining the exact stimulus patterns) that is a designed fea-
ture of the machine. It requires getting one’s visual system hooked up
in just the right way to experience this designed structure looking the
intended lemon-like way.
There will be many parts and features of the machine that causally
enable this designed structure to be revealed to the subject’s visual
awareness but which are not themselves revealed. Just as one does not
have visual awareness of one’s own eye nor of the photons of light that
are reflected from the objects that one does see,13 so there will be parts
of the machine that play analogous roles — they are causally effica-
cious but invisible intermediaries. So, for instance, the subject is not
supposed to be visually aware of the wires that dangle from her optic
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[13] I assume that nearly everyone agrees that we do not normally see photons of light in visual
perception. Though see O’Shaughnessy (1984) for a defence of the idea that we are con-
stantly seeing light when we visually perceive.
nerves. The suggestion is that the subject is visually aware of some
standing structured pattern that has been built into the machine — a
mind-independent feature that can be visually explored, via indefi-
nitely many different patterns of saccading, by any subject who gets
their visual system hooked up in the required manner.
So far then: I have argued that when we consider the class of hypo-
thetical cases where a perfect hallucination has been caused by some
ingenious external device, the relational theorist is quite within her
rights to treat such situations as instances of relational, world-involv-
ing experience, fundamentally akin to normal perception rather than
to dreams or to imperfect, real-life hallucinations. In these situations
the visual system would be operating normally and succeeding in
detecting and exploring a real, standing mind-independent feature,
something that other subjects in the same situation could likewise gain
relational awareness of. Of course, I do not intend any of the forego-
ing to be persuasive to opponents of the relational theory. My aim has
only been to convince those who are antecedently sympathetic to the
relational view that this ‘radical’ approach to perfect hallucinations is
not as crazy as it first seems. Moreover, we should recall here the dia-
lectical lesson of the opening section — we should prefer having to
revise our intuitions concerning the rare, strange, and so-far entirely
hypothetical class of perfect-hallucination-experiences to revising
our ‘natural conception’ of the familiar, everyday class of perceptual
experiences.
6. Perfect Chaotic Hallucinations
Presumably it is in some sense possible, though massively unlikely,
that the photoreceptors in the eye — or the ganglion cells in the optic
nerve — might begin to fire (generate electrochemical signals) even
though they have received no readily identifiable prior stimulus, but
due only to random quantum fluctuation or some such freak circum-
stance. And so presumably it is possible, though even more massively
unlikely, that such random firings precisely match the pattern of fir-
ings that would occur were the subject to see a lemon.14 But in such a
hypothetical case there would be no equivalent of the machine or
demon to be a candidate object of visual awareness — the subject, or
the disembodied brain, is perhaps just floating in empty space. So
there would be, by hypothesis, exactly the same neural activity as in a
perceptual visual experience but with absolutely no candidate object
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[14] Remember, these randomly caused firings would have to maintain a pattern for a non-neg-
ligible period of time, and would miraculously have to accord with the subject’s impulses
to saccade!
of awareness in the environment. Here, then, it would seem that the
CK assumption could only be employed in an argument from halluci-
nation and not in an argument from perception as there just is no can-
didate feature to be the object relatum in a relational experience.
David Chalmers has called this sort of possible situation the ‘Chaos
Hypothesis’:
Chaos Hypothesis: I do not receive inputs from anywhere in the world.
Instead, I have random, uncaused experiences. Through a huge coinci-
dence, they are exactly the sort of regular, structured experiences with
which I am familiar. The Chaos Hypothesis is an extraordinarily
unlikely hypothesis… But it is still one that could in principle obtain,
even if it has minuscule probability. (Chalmers, 2005, p. 23)
More recently, David Papineau, in a nod to Davidson’s Swampman
example, uses the label ‘cosmic swampbrain’:
Cosmic swampbrain: Two cases of subjects with intrinsically identical
brains, but where (a) one is a normal Earthly subject with normally rep-
resenting sensory states and (b) the other is a ‘cosmic swampbrain’ that
has randomly assembled itself along with supporting vat in outer space
and so arguably isn’t representing anything at all. (Papineau, 2014, p. 8)
I can imagine a few different kinds of move that a relational theorist
could try to make in response to the Perfect Chaotic Hallucination
scenario:
(a) One might try to make trouble for the assumption that the float-
ing-in-a-void brain really is behaving in exactly the same physical
manner as in the perceptual case. After all, presumably at some highly
microscopic scale or level of magnification there are, by hypothesis,
supremely unlikely quantum events taking place somewhere inside
the neurons of the brain in the chaos scenario that are absent in the per-
ceptual case. For in the perceptual case, energy is transferred from
some external stimulus, rather than generated by sheer random,
uncaused quantum fluke. And after all, there have been theorists (e.g.
Penrose, 1989; Lockwood, 2003) who have argued that quantum-
level activity is somehow essential to explaining consciousness.
(b) One might try to deny that such a chaotic case is really possible
— or, less ambitiously, one might try to insist that such a ‘merely logi-
cal’ possibility is not something that a theory of consciousness needs
to deal with. Compare: in response to Davidson’s Swampman exam-
ple, a friend of the teleo-functional theory of content might protest
that they are giving a theory of content as it naturally occurs in the
real world. It does not aim or need to deal with merely logically possi-
ble cases.
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(c) It remains theoretically open for the relational theorist to go
disjunctivist just about these chaotic perfect hallucinations — i.e. to
deny the CK assumption only for these chaotic kinds of perfect
hallucination.
(d) One might try to turn the tables on the proponent of the chaos
scenario:
If we are allowed to imagine that any external stimulus is absent and
replaced by sheer random quantum events, why can’t we imagine the
same occurring inside the brain? For example, whatever neural parts
or processes are alleged to provide the minimum supervenience base
for the conscious experience, we imagine a scenario in which various
arbitrary portions of the brain are missing but in which the activity of
these missing, supposedly vital, portions is miraculously compen-
sated for by sheer random quantum-level events. Why not just a single
neuron floating in the void and firing in just the same pattern as in the
perceptual case ‘by sheer chance’ with the rest of the brain’s activity
recreated by the random quantum flux? Indeed, why insist on the
brain at all? Consider the following ‘possible but massively unlikely’
scenario — a human body floating in the void, but whose skull cavity
is totally empty, no brain inside. Yet within this empty cranial space,
by sheer chance, random quantum level events occur which just hap-
pen to recreate the required stimulation to all the muscles in the face
and larynx and arms and hands, etc. so that the body produces fluent
conversation and expressive gestures just as if it did possess a
functioning brain.
Of course these are not meant as serious suggestions. I mention
them merely to show that ‘two can play at that game’. Anyone who
proposes a minimum supervenience base for an experience —
whether it is brain + external scene, or the whole brain alone, or just
some sub-portion of the brain — faces a potential challenge of this
form. We can always imagine that some of the proposed super-
venience base is missing but due to miraculous random chance the
absence, as it were, makes no difference to the continued normal func-
tioning of the remainder. So some other principled reason has to be
given for why one’s preferred supervenience base is just the right size
— not too small that is fails to support consciousness, not so large as
to include inessential elements.
Perhaps in the end none of these four are adequate responses.
But the important dialectical point to make about these perfect cha-
otic cases is that they seem to pose just as much of a problem for stan-
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dard representational theories of experience.15 If there is just nothing
else in the universe that is causally related to the lonely brain, floating
in the void, enjoying random, massively unlikely, uncaused neural
stimulations, then there is presumably nothing that the brain’s states
could represent, at least on standard theories of representational con-
tent. And indeed a number of prominent representational theorists
have been prepared to bite the bullet here and insist that an intrinsic
duplicate of a normal perceiver’s brain, but which lacks any causal
contact or history with anything else external to it, would indeed lack
representational states and hence would not have any phenomenal
consciousness (e.g. Dretske, 1996; Tye, 1995; Lycan, 2001; Byrne
and Tye, 2006).
In summary: the only kind of hallucinations that really put pressure
on the relational theorist to accept the CK assumption are perfect hal-
lucinations (neurally matching, hence phenomenally indistinguish-
able). I have suggested that someone who is, for whatever reason,
attracted to the relational view in the case of perceptions can simply
accept the CK assumption just for these perfect hallucinations
(though not for common-or-garden, non-matching, real-life halluci-
nations), by claiming that such ‘hallucinations’ would in fact be rela-
tional experiences of something mind-independent. It should be
admitted that this strategy seems to founder when faced with perfect
chaotic hallucinations — where, by hypothesis, there is no candidate
mind-independent feature to be related to. But this sort of perfect cha-
otic hallucination case is just as much of a problem for the main rival
position — the representational theory. Moreover, it is not clear how
much dialectical weight our intuitions about such a far-fetched case
should be allowed to bear. David Papineau writes:
Many will take it to be simply obvious that the contrasting pairs of sub-
jects must be consciously identical, given their intrinsic identity. Per-
haps we should not be too quick to side with this intuition in the case of
cosmic swampbrain. It is a strange and unfamiliar case, and maybe little
weight should be accorded to intuitions about such far-off possibilities.
(Papineau, 2014, p. 20)
So even without appealing to the subtle strategies of disjunctivism,
perfect hallucinations — supposedly the worst-case scenario for naïve
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[15] To be fair: a representational theory does seem to fare better with the case where a brain
that was previously housed in a normal human subject, then somehow finds itself having
random uncaused perfect hallucinations. In this sort of case the brain’s states during the
hallucination could still be ascribed representational content. It is only with a genuine
‘swampbrain’, which for its whole life has lacked causal contact with anything external to
it, that standard representational theories are in the same boat as the relational theory.
realism — should cause no more anxiety for the relational theorist
than is felt by her representational rivals.
And even if one is not interested in defending the relational theory
per se, the fact that it is at least a live option to endorse the CK assump-
tion, but to advance an ‘argument from perception’ rather than the
argument from hallucination, quite significantly alters the dialectic of
the traditional problem of perception and the role/importance of hallu-
cinations. For if it is a live option to advance an argument from per-
ception rather than from hallucination, then the traditional opposition
of ‘direct’ vs. ‘indirect’ theories of perceptual experience cannot be
resolved by appeal to the possibility of perfectly matching hallucina-
tions nor by defence of the CK assumption. We would need independ-
ent reasons to prefer an internalist theory of perceptual conscious-
ness16 to an essentially world-involving account of such experi-
ences.17
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